Incentive compatibility
A buyer bids truthfully if his bids on packages are equal to his utilities.
An auction is dominant strategy incentive compatible if each buyer maximizes his payoff by bidding truthfully regardless of what strategy other buyers follow.
An auction is ex post incentive compatible if each buyer maximizes his payoff by bidding truthfully as long as other buyers bid truthfully. 
1 Seller's marginal product MP S = V (N ). However, seller is not viewed as a strategic player with private information so MP S will play no role. The seller defines the rules of the auction and steps back.
A sealed-bid VCG auction is efficient and dominant strategy incentive compatible 1. Buyers submit sealed-bids, one for each bundle.
2. Compute the assignment that maximizes the sum of submitted bids.
3. For each buyer, compute the assignment that maximizes sum of bids with the buyer excluded.
4. Each buyer receives the allocation computed in 2, and pays his social opportunity cost (computed under the presumption that bidding is truthful).
In any selling scheme no buyer can hope to extract more than his marginal product. In the VCG auction, buyer b's surplus is
is the efficient assignment from step 2., and V (N \b) is from step 3. VCG auction rules imply
To compute VCG payments let
The assignment model Koopmans & Beckman (1957) , Gale (1960) , Shapley & Shubik (1972) , Gretsky, Ostroy & Zame (1999) B buyers, indexed b.
S sellers (or rather objects), indexed s. Each seller's cost is zero.
Each buyer has utility for one object. Unit demand assumption.
u bs buyer b's utility for object s, u bs ≥ 0.
x bs "fraction" of object s allocated to buyer b. , is an allocation of sellers (objects) to buyers.
• An efficient (feasible) assignment maximizes the sum of utilities of buyers.
• A vector of prices
Results
Walrasian prices exist in the assignment model.
The set of assignments supported by a Walrasian price vector is the set of efficient assignments. Sealed-bid VCG auction in the assignment model 1. Implements the smallest Walrasian price (i.e., price at which Demand = Supply).
• The smallest Walrasian price exists.
2. At the smallest Walrasian price each bidder gets his marginal product.
• This smallest price is the only market clearing price at which Demand = Supply after any single buyer is removed from the economy.
Ascending-price implementation of VCG auction 1. A dynamic mechanism for discovering the smallest price at which Demand = Supply.
2. A primal-dual algorithm on the LP formulation of the underlying exchange economy.
An ascending-price VCG auction in the assignment model (Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor 1986) The following auction is ex post incentive compatible.
0. Start with price zero for each object.
1. Buyers report their demand sets at current prices. If there is no overdemanded set, go to Step 3; otherwise go to Step 2.
2 2. Choose a minimal overdemanded set. Raise prices of all objects in this set until some buyer changes his demand set. Go to Step 1.
3. Assign each buyer an object in his demand set at current prices. Stop.
T -a subset of objects.
I(T ; p) -set of buyers whose demand at prices p is in T.
T is overdemanded if |I(T ; p)| > |T |.
2 An assignment is feasible iff there is no overdemanded set (Hall 1935). • w s is amount of excess demand for object s.
Buyers' utilities
A B φ u 1 4 7 0 u 2 8 7 0 u 3 6 4 0
Steps in the auction
• µ b is rate of decrease of b's surplus.
• ν s is rate of increase of price of object s.
The ascending-price auction 0. Start with price zero for each object.
2. Choose a minimal overdemanded set. Raise prices of all objects in this set until some buyer changes his demand set. Go to Step 1.
3. Assign each buyer an object in his demand set at current prices. Stop. • B buyers, b = 1, 2, ..., B.
• 1 seller, indexed s.
• k=1,2,...,K distinct indivisible commodities.
• ω ∈ Z K + , endowment of seller s.
• N = {s, 1, 2, ..., B} is the set of agents.
• Agent's utility functions
• No budget constraint: Each b's endowment of money > u b (ω)
• All agents are price takers.
An efficient assignment maximizes the sum of buyers' utilities:
A pricing function is p b (z) , ∀z ≤ ω, ∀b.
The price paid or received for a package may be non-linear in the objects in the package and may different for different buyers, i.e., non-anonymous.
The revenue received by the seller for feasible assignment Z = (z b ) is
• Z * is a feasible assignment,
• buyers maximize utilities: for all b,
• seller maximizes profits: for all feasible as-
To rationalize non-linear, non-anonymous pricing, impose the following trade restrictions:
B1. Each buyer may buy at most one package from the seller B2. Buyers may not resell packages to each other after buying from the seller
is the set of assignments in which b gets package z.
(1) Sum of fractions of packages bought is = 1 for each buyer.
(2) Sum of fractions of assignments sold is = 1.
(3) Demand = Supply.
Complementary slackness Utility max.
If LP 2 has an integer-valued optimal solution then solutions to DLP 2 are pricing equilibria.
The set of efficient assignments are (integer) optimal solutions to LP Gross substitutes condition on utilities.
The demand sets at two linear price vectors P = (p 1 , p 2 , ..., p K ), P = (p 1 , p 2 , ..., p K ):
The utility function u b (·) satisfies gross substitutes if
If buyers' utilities are gross substitutes then buyers are substitutes.
Gross substitute functions satisfy discrete concavity (Murota 2003) Ascending-price auctions as primal-dual algorithms If buyers are substitutes, then ascending-price auctions that implement the sealed-bid VCG auction outcome exist.
• Formulate an "appropriate" LP which yields efficient assignments.
• One solution to dual of LP is a non-manipulable price vector.
• Run a primal-dual algorithm which finds the non-manipulable price vector.
In order to get an ex post incentive compatible auction, primal-dual algorithm must end at an mp pricing equilibrium.
Ascending-price VCG auctions
• Homogeneous objects Decreasing marginal utility (Ausubel 1997) • Heterogeneous objects Gross substitutes (de Vries, Schummer, and Vohra 2007) In all of the above settings
The buyers are substitutes condition is satisfied
The nice properties of auctions under unit demand assumption extend
Limitations
Very little is known about combinatorial auctions when
• Budget constraints
• Information externalities
• Consumption externalities
